

Network Design under Equilibrium Constraints


Max Klimm
Humboldt University Berlin



Joint work with M. Gairing and T. Harks

Selfish flows

- ▶ Graph $G = (V, E)$
 - ▷ edge cost functions $c_e : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$
(strictly increasing, semi-convex, differentiable)
 - ▷ commodities $(s_i, t_i, d_i) \in V \times V \times \mathbb{R}_+$



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
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Definition — Wardrop equilibrium

Multicommodity flow $\mathbf{f} = (f_{i,P})$ with

$$\sum_{e \in P} c_e(f_e) \leq \sum_{e \in Q} c_e(f_e)$$

for all (s_i, t_i) -paths P, Q with $f_{i,P} > 0$.



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
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$$c_e(x) = x \text{ for all } e$$

Selfish flows


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
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
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
Braess' Paradox





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

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

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How can road networks be designed
so that good equilibria emerge?


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
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$$\min_{\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{z}} \sum_{e \in E} (c_e(f_e/z_e)f_e + z_e k_e)$$

$$\text{s.t.: } \mathbf{z} = (z_e)_{e \in E}, z_e \in \mathbb{R}_+$$

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
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
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potential function

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
potential function

\Leftrightarrow

$$\sum_{e \in E} c_e(f_e/z_e)(f_e - g_e) \leq 0 \text{ for all flows } \mathbf{g}$$

variational inequality

Example




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
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
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- ▶ optimal capacity for $c_e(f_e/z_e) = f_e/z_e + b$

Example



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► total costs for e :

$$\begin{aligned} C_e &= \text{routing costs} + \text{installation costs} \\ &= c_e(f_e/z_e)f_e + k_e z_e = f_e^2/z_e + b f_e + k_e z_e \end{aligned}$$

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
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
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
Example

$k_e=1$ for all e




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
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- $\min_z (f/z+b)f + z$ attained for $z^* = f$

Example


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
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
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
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- ▶ $\min_z (f/z + b)f + z$ attained for $z^* = f$
- ▶ opt w/o equilibrium: $7 + \frac{1}{2}$
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
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


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Example

$k_e=1$ for all e



Optimization under equilibrium constraints

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Previous work

- ▶ “one of the most important, difficult and challenging problems in transport” [Yang, Bell ‘98]
- ▶ various heuristics e.g. [Dafermos ‘69][Dantzig et al. ‘79]
- ▶ approximation algorithm [Marcotte ‘85]
 - ▷ 5/4-approximation for affine costs $c(f/z) = a + b(f/z)$
 - ▷ closed formula for monomials $c(f/z) = a + b(f/z)^d$, converges to 2 as $d \rightarrow \infty$

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- approximation algorithm with improved guarantee

Complexity

Theorem

The CNDP is **APX**-hard.

- ▶ even if all costs are affine.


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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Approximation

The relaxation

Continuous network design problem — Relaxation

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
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$\mathbf{f} = (f_e)_{e \in E}$ is a flow

Lemma

[Marcotte '85; Harks, Gairing, K., '14]

The relaxation can be solved in polynomial time.



Quality of the relaxation

- ▶ Price of Anarchy (PoA) = $\frac{\text{Routing Cost of Wardrop equilibrium}}{\text{Routing cost of optimum}}$

Theorem

$\text{PoA} \leq \frac{1}{1-\mu}$ where $\mu = \sup_{c \in \mathcal{C}, x \geq 0} \max_{\gamma \in [0,1]} \gamma \left(1 - \frac{c(\gamma \cdot x)}{c(x)}\right)$.

[Roughgarden, Tardos '02; Correa et al. '04]


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- Price of Anarchy (PoA) = $\frac{\text{Routing Cost of Wardrop equilibrium}}{\text{Routing cost of optimum}}$

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$\text{PoA} \leq \frac{1}{1-\mu}$ where $\mu = \sup_{c \in \mathcal{C}, x \geq 0} \max_{\gamma \in [0,1]} \gamma \left(1 - \frac{c(\gamma \cdot x)}{c(x)}\right)$.

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
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

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
- affine: $\mu = 1/4$ for $\gamma = 1/2$

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
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
Our contribution

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[Gairing, Harks, K., '14]

There is a ρ -approximation with

$$\rho \leq \frac{(\gamma+\mu+1)^2}{(\gamma+\mu+1)^2 - 4\mu\gamma}.$$



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- ▶ Prof: $\mu \leq 1$ and $\gamma \leq 1$ for all \mathcal{C} , ρ non-decreasing in μ and γ .

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Input: $G = (N, E)$, (ce)

Output:

- ▶ Compute μ, γ
- ▶ $(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{f}) \leftarrow$ Solution of the relaxation

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
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
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
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
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Approximation guarantee

Lemma

Approximation factor of Marcotte's Algorithm $\leq 1+\mu$.

- ▶ Let $x_e = f_e^*/z_e^*$
- ▶ by local optimality of z_e^* , we have $k_e = c'_e(x_e)x_e^2$

$$C(\mathbf{f}^*, \mathbf{z}^*) = \sum_{e \in E} c_e(f_e^*/z_e^*)f_e^* + k_e z_e^* = \sum_{e \in E} \left(c_e(x_e) + c'_e(x_e)x_e \right) f_e^*$$

- ▶ $\mu = \max_{\gamma} \left(\gamma \left(1 - \frac{c_e(\gamma x)}{c_e(x)} \right) \right) = \gamma \frac{c'_e(x)x}{c_e(x) + c'_e(x)x}$ s.t. $c_e(x/\gamma) = c_e(x) + c'_e(x)x$

$$\begin{aligned} C(\mathbf{f}^*, \mathbf{z}) &= \sum_{e \in E} c_e(x_e/\gamma_e) f_e^* + k_e \gamma_e z_e^* \\ &= \sum_{e \in E} \left(c_e(x_e) + c'_e(x_e)x_e \right) f_e^* + \gamma_e c'_e(x_e)x_e f_e^* \\ &\leq (1 + \mu) C(\mathbf{f}^*, \mathbf{z}^*) \end{aligned}$$

Conclusion

- ▶ Many networks used by selfish users
- ▶ Network design with equilibrium constraints harder than regular network design
- ▶ Approximation algorithms based on relaxation
 - ▷ 49/41-approximation for affine costs
 - ▷ 8/5-approximation for general costs
- ▶ Thank you